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I. INTRODUCTION
Marketing efforts by health care providers have historically presented one
of the most sensitive areas under the federal health care anti-kickback statute,
42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (the "anti-kickback statute"). Recently-enacted
regulations relating to the anti-kickback statute impact indirect health care
providers. As such, the anti-kickback statute potentially excludes major
manufacturers of pharmaceuticals, medical equipment and medical goods
from participating in federal health care programs. Consequently, products
manufactured by these entities would not be reimbursable.' This article will
provide a legal overview of the anti-kickback statute and its so-called safe
harbors. Furthermore, it will analyze the Department of Health and Human
Services' Office of Inspector General's ("OIG") interpretation and application
of the statute to marketing relationships. It will then look at the evolution of
these interpretations to provide guidance in structuring relationships between
health care providers and marketers in order to minimize the possibility of
prosecution under the statute.
* Health Law Section, Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, PC, Washington, D.C.
B.A., Northwestern University 1990; J.D., University of Wisonsin 1993; LL.M. (Health Law) Loyola
University Chicago School of Law 1996.
See Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Revised OIG Exclusion Authorities Resulting from
Public Law 104-191, 63 Fed. Reg. 46,676,46,678 (1998) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 1000.10).
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II. ANTI-KICKBACK STATUTE
The federal health care anti-kickback statute is far broader than many
health care providers realize. It establishes criminal and civil penalties for
persons who "knowingly and willfully" offer, pay, solicit or receive any
remuneration, directly or indirectly, in cash or in kind, in return for referrals
of goods or services that may be paid for, in whole or in part, by a federal
health care program, including the federal Medicare program or a state
Medicaid program. The statute also prohibits remuneration to induce referrals
to purchase, lease, order, arrange for or recommend the purchasing, leasing,
or ordering goods or services payable by a federal health care program.
Because the statute is so broad, prohibiting "arranging for or recommending
purchasing, leasing or ordering," it appears to prohibit most marketing
activities by its very terms. As the OIG has noted:
... we believe that many marketing and advertising activities may
involve at least technical violations of the statute. We, of course,
recognize that many of these activities do not warrant prosecution in
part because (1) they are passive in nature, i.e., the activities do not
involve direct contact with program beneficiaries, or (2) the
individual or entity involved in these promotions is not involved in
the delivery of health care. Such individuals or entities are not in a
position of public trust in the same manner as physicians or other
health care professionals who recommend or order products and
services for their patients.2
In 1987, responding to health care providers' claims that the broad scope
of the anti-kickback statute created an uncertain climate in which to conduct
business, Congress created four statutory exceptions to the statute3and
directed the OIG to issue "regulations specifying payment practices that will
2 Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; OIG Anti-Kickback Provisions,
56 Fed. Reg. 35,952, 35,974 (1991) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt 1001).
3 The four original statutory exceptions to the anti-kickback statute are for
(1) discounts or reductions in price if properly disclosed and appropriately reflected in
costs claimed or charges made;
(2) payments to employees under a bonafide employer/employee relationship;
(3) certain payments by vendors to group purchasing organizations; and
(4) waiver of coinsurance for certain limited Medicare Part B services by a federally
qualified health care center with respect to an individual who qualifies for subsidized
services under a Public Health Service Act program.
42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(3) (1999).
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not be subject to criminal prosecution under the [anti-kickback] statute and
that will not provide a basis for exclusion from participation in Medicare or
State health care programs.4 Subsequently, in 1996, Congress, in passing the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA"),
created another exception for risk-sharing arrangements.5
The OIG has promulgated a number of safe "harbor regulations" defining
conduct that will not violate the statute.6 For purposes of this article, the most
relevant of these are the safe harbor for employees and the safe harbor for
personal services and management contracts.' The employee safe harbor is
relatively straightforward: it provides that payment by an employer to an
employee who has a bona fide employment relationship with the employer for
the provision of items or services for which payment may be made in whole
or in part under Medicare or a State Medicaid program does not constitute
"remuneration" for purposes of the anti-kickback statute! The safe harbor for
personal services or management contracts is more involved. To be afforded
safe harbor protection, an arrangement must meet each of the following six
standards:
4 Section 14(a) of the Medicare and Medicaid Patient Protection Act of 1987, P.L. 100-93,
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-Th(b)(3)(E) (1999) and 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952. This act also expanded civil
money penalties and assessments, and expanded mandatory and discretionary exclusions. Subsequently,
Section 216 of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act created an additional exception for
certain risk-sharing arrangements. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(3)(F) (1999).
5 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, § 216, Pub. Law 104-191 (Aug.
21, 1996) codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(3)(F) (1999).
6 There are currently thirteen final regulatory safe harbors that apply to the following categories
of arrangements:
I. investment interests in large publicly-traded entities or certain small entities;
2. space rentals;
3. equipment rentals;
4. personal services and management contracts;





10. group purchasing organizations;
11. certain Medicare Part A waivers of coinsurance and deductibles;
12. increased coverage, reduced cost-sharing amounts, or reduced premium amounts
offered by certain health plans; and
13. price reductions offered to certain health plans.
42 C.F.R. § 1001.952 (1998).
Because the focus of this article is upon contractual relationships between a health care provider
and a marketing company, this article will not analyze the potential impact of the employee statutory
exception and safe harbor, 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(i) (1998).
a 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(i) (1998).
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a. the agreement is set out in writing and signed by the parties;
b. the agreement specifies the services to be provided by the agent;
c. if the agreement is intended to provide for the services of the
agent on a periodic, sporadic or part-time basis, rather than on a
full-time bases for the term of the agreement, the agreement
specifies exactly the schedule of such intervals, their precise
length, and the exact charge for each such interval;
d. the term of the agreement is for not less than one year;
e. the aggregate compensation paid over the term of the agreement
is set in advance, is consistent with fair market value in arms-
length transactions, and is not determined in a manner that takes
into account the volume or value of any referrals or business
otherwise generated between the parties for which payment may
be made in whole or in part under Medicare or a state health care
program; and
f. the services performed under the agreement do not involve the
counseling or promotion of a business arrangement or other
activity that violates any state or federal law.9
Failure to meet the requirements of a particular safe harbor does not mean
that an arrangement is per se illegal. Rather, in such a situation, the OIG will
analyze the particular facts and circumstances underlying the arrangement to
determine its legality.1°
Violations of the anti-kickback statute constitute a felony punishable by
a maximum fine of $25,000, or imprisonment for up to five years, or both."
Additionally, any individual or entity that is criminally convicted of violating
the anti-kickback statute will be automatically excluded from participation in
the Medicare, Medicaid, or any other federally-funded health care program. 2
Moreover, the OIG also may seek to exclude an individual or entity that has
9 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(d) (1998).
10 As the OIG noted in the preamble to the safe harbor regulations, the failure of an arrangement
to comply with a safe harbor can mean one of three things. First, it may mean that the arrangement is not
intended to induce the referral of business reimbursable under Medicare of Medicaid, so there is no reason
to comply with the safe harbor standards, and no risk of prosecution. Second, the arrangement could be
a clear statutory violation, and prosecution would be "very likely." Third, the arrangement may violate the
statute in a less serious manner, although it might not be in compliance with a safe harbor provision. In
such instances, the preamble indicates that there would be "no way" to predict the degree of risk. See
Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; OIG Anti-Kickback Provisions, 56 Fed. Reg.
35,952, 35,954 (1991) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 1001)
1 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(l)(B) (1999).
12 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(a)(1) (1999).
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violated the anti-kickback statute through an administrative proceeding,
irrespective of any criminal charges.' 3 Finally, under statutory amendments
promulgated pursuant to the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, the 0IG may
impose upon or assess from, any individual or entity violating the anti-
kickback statute civil money penalties of up to $50,000 per violation or up to
three times the total amount of a kickback paid regardless of the legitimacy of
any remuneration. 4
IH. CASE LAW
In interpreting the federal anti-kickback statute for purposes of imposing
civil or criminal penalties or exclusions, courts have held that the statute is
very broad in scope and encompasses any arrangement where a purpose of the
remuneration is to obtain money for the referral of services or to induce
further referrals.' 5 Also, the anti-kickback statute does not define the terms
"knowingly" and "willfully." As a result, courts have interpreted these words
in a variety of ways for purposes of applying the statute to a particular
arrangement.'6 Although none of these court decisions relates to a marketing
relationship per se, it is clear that there is a trend toward interpreting the anti-
kickback statute broadly for purposes of exclusion or imposing civil or
criminal penalties.
Although there is currently no case law concerning governmental actions
to impose penalties under the anti-kickback statute, several civil lawsuits have
13 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b)(7) (1999).
14 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(a)(7) (1999).
1s See, e.g., United States v. CGeber, 760 F.2d 68 (3d Cir.), cert. den., 474 U.S. 988 (1985); United
States v. Kats, 871 F.2d 105 (9th Cir. 1989)(adopting Greber's "one purpose test").
16 See, e.g., United States v. Levin, 973 F.2d 463 (6th Cir. 1992), reprinted in Medicare and
Medicaid Guide (CCH) [Transfer Binder 1992-2] 1 40,461 (dismissing anti-kickback prosecution where
HHS previously approved the marketing practice in question, on the ground that prior approval made it
impossible to establish requisite criminal intent); Hanlester Network v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 1390, 1400 (9th
Cir. 1995) (stating that "knowingly and willfully" requires defendants to (1) know that the anti-kickback
statute prohibits offering or paying remuneration to induce referrals, and (2) engage in prohibited conduct
with specific intent to disobey the law); United States v. Neufeld, 908 F. Supp. 491,497 (S.D. Ohio 1995)
(refusing to adopt the Hanlester definition of "willfully" but also hesitating from "embarking on an exact
definition of the scienter requirement .. "); United States v. Jain, 93 F.3d 436 (8th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 2452 (1997) (upholding jury instruction that willfulness" should be found if the
defendant acted "unjustifiably and wrongfully" in taking fees for referring patients to a psychiatric hospital
if he knew that his conduct should be so characterized); United States v. Davis, 132 F.3d 1092 (5th Cir.
1998) (defining knowingly as an act "done voluntarily and intentionally, not because of mistake or
accident," an "willfully" as an act "committed voluntarily and purposely with the specific intent to do
something the law forbids; that is to say, with bad purpose either to disobey or disregard the law); United
States v. Starks, 157 F.3d 833 (11 th Cir. 1998) (upholding the Davis definition of "willfully").
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invalidated marketing arrangements because such arrangements are illegal
under the statute. For example, one court invalidated a marketing agreement
between Quantum Health Services, Inc. ("Quantum"), a supplier of durable
medical equipment, and Nursing Home Consultants, Inc. ("NHC"), a company
that marketed medical supplies to nursing home patients. 7 Under that
marketing agreement, NHC was to identify Medicare recipients who needed
medical supplies and put those recipients in touch with Quantum. Quantum
would then sell its products directly to the nursing homes (on behalf of the
patients). NHC would, in turn, receive compensation determined upon a per-
item basis, derived from the number of units Quantum sold to nursing home
residents identified by NHC. Allegedly, Quantum shipped goods to the
nursing homes through affiliates that were not parties to the marketing
agreement in an attempt to circumvent its payment obligations, and NHC sued.
Quantum countered that the marketing agreement itself was illegal and that the
contract was, therefore, unenforceable. The court agreed, concluding that the
contract violated the anti-kickback statute:
[t]he Marketing Agreement, by virtue of its compensation scheme,
falls directly within the class of transactional relationships prohibited
by [the federal anti-kickback statute]. NHC was paid for referring
persons who needed Medicare-covered supplies to Quantum, who in
turn sold them those supplies (via their nursing homes).... ."
In the alternative, the court stated that the relationship between Quantum
and NHC could be characterized as a payment for recommending to Medicare
recipients that they purchase supplies from Quantum in violation of the anti-
kickback statute. 9 In addition, the court noted that the marketing agreement
did not meet applicable safe harbor criteria. Thus, the court concluded: "[n]o
matter how you slice it, the Marketing Agreement violates [the federal anti-
kickback statute], and accordingly the subject matter of that agreement ... is
prohibited by that statute, as is the performance of that agreement."2
In another case, Modem Medical Laboratories, a court reviewed a breach
of contract action related to an agreement to market, manage and operate
medical laboratories.2 ' In this instance, SmithKline argued, and the court
17 -Armstrong Health Care, Inc. v. Nuts. Home Consultants, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 835 (E.D. Ark.
1996)
Is Id. at 842-43.
19 Id. at 843
0 Id.
21 Modem Medical Laboratories, Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Clinical Laboratories, Inc., No. 92
C 5302, 1994 WL 449281 (N.D. I1. Aug. 17, 1994),
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agreed, that the contract was illegal because it involved arranging for the
purchasing of a Medicaid-reimbursable service. The court stated: "As we
read this subsection, it criminalizes broker-style arrangements whereby one
entity receives remuneration for placing business with another entity. 22 The
court noted that it was irrelevant that a physician made the initial decision to
purchase certain testing services. Rather, the court indicated that the federal
anti-kickback statute reaches activity whereby one entity receives remune-
ration for essentially taking an "order" and arranging for another entity to per-
form the work.23 Similarly, a Florida court invalidated a consulting agreement
involving the marketing of durable medical equipment to physicians, nursing
homes, retirement homes, and individual patients because the agreement
involved payment of a percentage of sales.24 In conclusion, there is ample
court authority holding that a simple percentage-based marketing arrangement
may, in some instances, violate the anti-kickback statute.
IV. 0IG AUTHORITY
A. Comments in Preamble to Safe Harbors
The OIG has long held that payments of marketing commissions may
violate the anti-kickback statute:
In response to the October 21, 1987, request for comments, many
commentators have suggested that we broaden the [employment]
exemption to apply to independent contractors paid on a commission
basis. We have declined to adopt this approach because we are aware
of many abusive practices by sales personnel who are paid as
independent contractors and who are not under appropriate
supervision. We believe that if individuals and entities desire to pay
a salesperson on the basis of the amount of business they generate,
then to be exempt from civil or criminal prosecution, they should
make these salespersons employees where they can and should exert
appropriate supervision for the individual's acts.25
The OIG consistently maintained its opposition to expanding the
employee safe harbor to include independent contractors paid on a
22 Id. at *3.
2 Id.
2 Medical Dev. Network, Inc., v. Prof. Respiratory Care/Home Medical Equip. Serv., Inc., 673
So.2d 565 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
25 See 54 Fed. Reg. 3088, 3089 (Jan. 23, 1989).
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commission basis. In comments to the preamble of the final safe harbors
issued in 1991, the OIG stated:
We continue to reject this approach because of the existence of
widespread abusive practices by salespersons who are independent
contractors and, therefore, who are not under appropriate supervision
and control. Although two commenters asserted that they could
achieve appropriate supervision and control of independent
contractors by including restrictive terms in the contract, we cannot
expand this provision to cover such relationships unless we can
predict with reasonable certainty that they will not be abusive. We
are confident that the employer-employee relationship is unlikely to
be abusive, in part because the employer is generally fully liable for
the actions of its employees and is therefore more motivated to
supervise and control them.26
Significantly, however, in response to other comments requesting that the
OIG protect marketing and advertising activities because such activities
promote competition or do not violate the statute, the OIG noted that many
marketing and advertising activities may involve at least technical violations
of the anti-kickback statute.27 The OIG then stated that many of these
marketing and advertising activities should not be subject to prosecution
because they are passive in nature and do not involve direct contact with
program beneficiaries, or because the individual or entity involved in these
promotions is not involved in the delivery of health care.28
B. OIG Advisory Opinions
Another source of guidance with respect to the applicability of the anti-
kickback statute to a particular arrangement is the OIG advisory opinion
process. In order to assist health care providers in structuring their
relationships, Congress, in 1996, passed legislation directing the OIG to issue
written advisory opinions regarding, among other things, whether certain
conduct (including but not limited to the anti-kickback statute) could result in
the imposition of civil or criminal penalties or exclusion from participation in
federal health care programs. 9 Each advisory opinion is binding upon the
2 56 Fed. Reg. 35,952, 35,981 (July 29, 1991).
27 Id. at 35,974.
n Id.
29 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L No. 104-191, § 205
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7d (1999)).
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Department of Health and Human Services and the parties thereto with respect
to the issues that are addressed in that opinion.30 Thus, the purpose of the
advisory opinion process is to allow the agency with expertise on health care
fraud matters (the OIG) to immunize business arrangements from prosecution
and to promote consistency and uniformity in the interpretation of the federal
health care anti-fraud provisions contained in the Social Security Act.
To date, the OIG has issued several advisory opinions discussing
percentage-based marketing arrangements.3 The first of these, OIG Advisory
Opinion 98-1, dealt with a consignment arrangement to market durable
medical equipment and the potential violation of several other laws, including
prohibitions upon submitting claims substantially in excess of usual charges,
false claims, and provision of items or services not provided as claimed.32
Without repeating the complex facts underlying this opinion in detail, the OIG
focused on three factors in determining that the percentage compensation
arrangement is problematic:
(1) The arrangement included significant financial incentives
that increase the risk of abusive marketing and billing
practices. Here, the OIG noted that the marketing company
would be billing and submitting claims to the Medicare
program.
(2) The marketing company would have direct contact with
referral sources and possibly Medicare patients.
(3) The arrangement contained no safeguards against fraud and
abuse. The OIG was especially suspect of this arrangement
because a recent OIG report had concluded that orthotics
were subject to significant abuse.33 In this instance, the OIG
noted that the orthotics in question were paid for by patients
and third party payors, rather than by the physicians who
would order and dispense them.
The OIG concluded that the arrangement posed "an unacceptable risk" of
fraud and abuse so as to preclude a favorable advisory opinion.
A second OIG advisory opinion regarding an arrangement between a
physician practice management company ("PPMC") and a physician further
30 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7d(b)(4)(A) (1999).
31 This article was drafted in December, 1998. Although the author has made sporadic attempts
to update it since then, time constraints preclude a more complete discussion of the relevant advisory
opinions issued since that date.
32 OIG Advisory Opinion 98-1 (March 19, 1998).
33 See OIG Report, Medicare Orthotics, (OIE-02-95-00380, October, 1997).
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identified issues of concern with respect to marketing activities.34 In this
arrangement, the PPMC would engage in direct marketing services and would
set up a network to which the physician would be required to refer his
patients. In return, the PPMC would receive a percentage of the physician's
net revenues.
In analyzing the arrangement, the OIG reiterated its position that
percentage-based compensation may implicate the anti-kickback statute. The
OIG then pronounced the same three concerns it raised in Advisory Opinion
98-1 (that the arrangement may include financial incentives to increase
referrals, there was a lack of safeguards against overutilization, and financial
incentives that might increase the risk of abusive billing practices). However,
based upon the discussion contained in Advisory Opinion 98-4, it is evident
that the requestor did not supply the OIG with detailed information concerning
the type of marketing activities that the PPMC would undertake. As such, it
is not surprising that the OIG rendered a negative decision, because in the
absence of materials justifying the relationship, the OIG had no basis to
assume that the marketing activities would be conducted in a manner that
would not be detrimental to the federal health care programs.
In an subsequent advisory opinion request in which the OIG was provided
with substantially more information, the OIG did issue an opinion that
provides important guidance with respect to how percentage-based
compensation arrangements may be structured in order to avoid prosecution
under the anti-kickback statute.35 This opinion is significant because it
indicates that the OIG would not seek to prosecute or impose other penalties
upon a manufacturer and a sales agent who entered into a percentage-based
independent contractor relationship. Under the arrangement, a manufacturer
of disposable medical supplies agreed to pay the sales agent a commission of
1% to 1.25% of invoiced amounts to six potential purchasers. The sales
agent's representation of the manufacturer was limited to submitting bids and
negotiating contracts with the purchasers and making routine follow-up calls
to resolve questions and to report and reconcile group purchasing organization
fees and discounts.
In analyzing the arrangement, the OIG looked at six specific "suspect
characteristics" identified as being associated with an increased potential for
program abuse, particularly overutilization and excessive program costs.
These factors were:
34 OIG Advisory Opinion 98-4 (April 15, 1998).
35 OIG Advisory Opinion 98-10 (August 31, 1998).
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1. Compensation based upon percentage of sales;
2. Direct billing of a Federal health care program by the seller for
the item or service sold by the sales agent;
3. Direct contact between the sales agent and physicians in a
position to order items or services that are paid for by a federal
health care program;
4. Direct contact between the sales agent and Federal health care
program beneficiaries;
5. Use of sales agents who are health care professionals or persons
who are in a similar position to exert undue influence on
purchasers or patients; or
6. Marketing of items or services that are separately reimbursable by
a Federal health care program, whether on the basis of charges or
costs.
In concluding that the arrangement would not be subject to prosecution,
the OIG noted that although the agreement involved percentage-based
compensation, none of the other factors triggering increased scrutiny was
present.
V. STRUCTURING MARKETING ARRANGEMENTS
Based upon the authority referenced above, there is ample reason for
providers to be cautious in structuring their marketing arrangements.
Inasmuch as a marketing relationship, by its very nature, involves the
generation of business for a health care provider, any payments made or
received under such an arrangement may well constitute a "knowing" and
"willful" violation of the anti-kickback statute. Moreover, civil courts have
interpreted the statute broadly for purposes of invalidating contractual
arrangements, and civil courts do not appear to recognize the OIG's
distinction between "technical" violations of the anti-kickback statute and
more flagrant violations that will be subject to prosecution.36 Finally,
providers should realize that their activities may be subject to prosecution
under the statute even if they do not increase costs to the Medicare or
Medicaid programs.37
36 See 56 Fed. Reg. 35,954 (setting forth three possible scenarios for failure to comply with a safe
harbor: an arrangement may not fall within the statute, it may be a clear statutory violation, and it may
"violate the statute in a less serious manner" that may be subject to prosecution based upon the many
factors that are part of the decision-making process regarding case selection and prosecution).
37 See id. quoting U.S. v. Ruttenberg, 625 F.2d 173, 177 n.9 (7th Cir. 1980).
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A. Employment
As implied by the OIG's 1989 comments to the proposed safe harbor
regulations, the easiest way for a health care provider to ensure that its
marketing activities do not violate the anti-kickback statute is to have its own
employees engage in marketing. 38 According to the OIG, employees engaged
in marketing can be paid on a commission basis that takes into account the
volume or value of referrals they generate. However, the employee safe
harbor only protects relationships where the employee is "furnishing" an item
or service payable in whole or in part under the Medicare or a State Medicaid
program. Because marketing services are not reimbursed by Medicare or a
State Medicaid program, a literal interpretation of the employee safe harbor
would preclude payments to marketers from falling in that safe harbor.3 9 It
remains to be seen whether other courts will adopt this extremely rigid view
of the scope of the employment safe harbor, especially since the OIG's own
pronouncements with respect to the scope of that safe harbor support the
conclusion that marketing employees can be paid on a commission basis.
B. Personal Services and Management Contracts
As a practical matter, many providers may find it difficult, if not
impossible, to conduct their advertising, sales and marketing activities solely
through employees because of the need for specialized data bases, mailing,
televising, or otherwise disseminating information to prospective patients or
referral sources. Moreover it may be difficult for providers to negotiate one-
year contracts with fixed compensation that would qualify for protection
under the personal services and management contracts safe harbor.'
39 The OIG has proposed a regulation that would enable it to prosecute "any transaction or other
device entered into or employed for the purpose of appearing to fit within a safe harbor when the substance
of the transaction or device is not accurately reflected in the form." 59 Fed. Reg. 37,202, 37,203. Thus,
it is possible that even a bona fide employment relationship will not protect a marketing activity. However,
in this instance, because there is also a statutory exception exempting payments to employees from the
scope of the statute, it is the author's conclusion that the likelihood of the OIG prosecuting a bona fide
employment relationship as a "sham" transaction is minimal.
39 The Starks court, in dicta, expressed support for this narrow interpretation of the employee safe
harbor.
40 Readers would also be advised that the anti-kickback statute does not define the term "fair
market value," the determination of which is a necessary step to receiving protection under the personal
services and management contract safe harbor. One case, United States v. Lipkis, 770 F.2d 1447 (9th Cir.
1985), emphasized the importance of determining fair market value when assessing the legitimacy of
payments between parties who are in a position to make referrals.
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C. Relationships that Do Not Qualify for Safe Harbor Protection
Where a relationship does not qualify for a safe harbor (and, as indicated
above, in the case of a "sham" relationship, even where the relationship does
qualify for a safe harbor), providers will be forced to live with a degree of
uncertainty as to whether they may face prosecution under the anti-kickback
statute. In short, because the OIG has taken the position that any pure
marketing relationship may constitute at least a technical violation of the anti-
kickback statute, providers may be forced to accept the fact that any marketing
activity may constitute a technical violation of the statute and focus upon
reducing the risk of prosecution.41 Stated otherwise, the ultimate goal of
structuring any marketing relationship may be not so much to comply with the
terms of the anti-kickback statute or a safe harbor as to prevent "abuses" (or
perceived abuses) against federal health care programs.42
At the outset, providers should be aware that there may be a much
different standard for the OIG to approve a relationship in an advisory opinion
or to take civil or criminal action against the parties to the same arrangement.
Stated otherwise, while the OIG is likely to render a favorable advisory
opinion to a transaction that is "spotless" on paper, it is significantly less
likely that the OIG will prosecute a marketing relationship unless the
arrangement itself results in abusive practices directed toward federal health
care programs. The remainder of this article will enumerate criteria that
providers may wish to consider in structuring their marketing relationships
under the anti-kickback statute.43
41 The author cautions that the scope of this statement is limited to marketing arrangements.
Relationships that have a marketing component, but that are not "pure" marketing arrangements, might not
violate the anti-kickback statute because the purpose of those arrangements may not be to induce referrals.
See, e.g., U.S. v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68, 71 (3d Cir. 1985); U.S. v. Bay State Ambulance, 874 F.2d 20, 30
(lst Cir. 1989) (both cases holding that payments violate the anti-kickback statute if "one purpose" is to
induce referrals).
42 On the other hand, the OIG itself has acknowledged that providers may legitimately conduct
marketing activities. For example, in its Model Compliance Plan for Clinical Laboratories, the OIG stated
that "[l]aboratory compliance plans should require honest, straightforward fully informative and non-
deceptive marketing." Publication of the OIG Model Compliance Program Plan for Clinical Laboratory,
62 Fed. Reg. 9,435, 9,438 (1997). A revised version of this guidance entitled "Compliance Program
Guidance for Clinical Laboratories" was published in Publication of OIG Compliance Program Guidance
for Clinical Laboratories, 63 Fed. Reg. 45,076 (1998). Notwithstanding this tacit approval of marketing
by a health care provider, it is clear that the analysis of almost any marketing activity will be subject to a
"facts and circumstances" review.
43 Although some of these criteria apply only to relationships that do not qualify for safe harbor
protection, as stated above, the anti-kickback statute does not protect the actual conduct of any marketing
activities by marketers themselves.
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In a solicitation for proposals for new safe harbors, the OIG has identified
several potentially relevant factors to consider when assessing a particular
practice." Although these factors apply only to proposals for new safe
harbors, it is likely that they will also play a role in determining whether a
particular arrangement that does not qualify for safe harbor protection will be
prosecuted. The factors enumerated by the OIG in its solicitation include:
" The impact on access to health care services;
* The impact on quality of health care services;
* The impact upon competition among health care providers;
" The cost to federal health care programs;
" The potential for overutilization of health care services;
• The ability of health care facilities to provide services in
medically underserved areas or to medically underserved
populations; and
" The potential financial benefits to health care professionals or
providers that may vary based upon their prescribing and referral
decisions.
The OIG's analysis of a particular activity will typically, if indirectly, turn
upon these criteria, and providers would be well-advised to consider these
factors in determining how to conduct their marketing activities. Given the
OIG's long-standing suspicions of marketing activities and relationships,
providers should be careful to weigh each of these factors equally.4"
The OIG has never published any statement reflecting a desire to end all
marketing practices. However, the OIG has repeatedly expressed concerns
related to the vulnerability of elderly patients to a variety of marketing
practices and the fact that, because of asymmetry of information, health care
providers may be able to exert substantial influence over the purchasing
decisions of their patients.' Thus, one consideration is the nature of the
contact between a marketer and a patient. For example, passive advertising
may be viewed as less intrusive than door-to-door marketing, telephone
solicitations, and targeted direct mail. Similarly, marketing activities by a
Solicitation of New Safe Harbors and Modifcations to Existing Safe Harbors, 61 Fed. Reg.
69,060, 69,061 (1996).
45 For example, the OIG has specifically stated that increased cost to the Medicare and Medicaid
programs and harm to beneficiaries are not the only criteria that the OIG will look at in determining whether
a particular business arrangement is abusive. Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse;
OIG Anti-Kickback Provisions, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,954 (1991) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 1001).
46 Of course, the 0I0 has also expressed concerns regarding blatantly fraudulent activity
undertaken by marketers.
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health care provider or other persons in a position of trust may be more likely
to be subject to scrutiny. Activities that target senior citizens, Medicaid
beneficiaries, or other "vulnerable" audiences may be more "at risk" than
broad-based marketing activities. On the other hand, informational marketing
efforts directed at health care professionals may be less risky, because by
virtue of their training and experience, such professionals, on the other hand,
can be expected to exercise independent judgment. Finally, marketing
arrangements that relate to an item or service that has undergone a rapid
increase in utilization or been subject to past abuses should be reviewed with
extra caution.
Another factor that the OIG is likely to consider in deciding whether to
prosecute any marketing relationship is billing. As the OIG indicated in
Advisory Opinion 98-4, where marketing functions are delegated along with
billing functions, the possibilities for fraud and abuse increase because the
marketer will be capable of inflating its compensation by submitting false
claims. The OIG has repeatedly expressed concern over such billing
relationships, and it can be expected to be suspicious of any relationship that
does not qualify for safe harbor protection if it involves both a billing and
marketing component.47
Providers should consider, as objectively as possible, whether the
marketing activities will benefit patients by increasing awareness of a product
or improving quality. While patients in certain markets may have a wide
variety of choices of providers, in others, lack of information and competition
may mean that patients are medically under served with regard to particular
medical services. Without making blanket statements with regard to particular
arrangements, examples of marketing or sales activities that may increase
access and quality include educational seminars and materials provided to
physicians and/or patients.41 Similarly, medical compliance and follow-up
activities that ensure a patient is complying with a plan of care may be viewed
as beneficial, if properly conducted. These factors should be counterbalanced
47 See, e.g., OIG Advisory Opinion 98-4; OIG Special Fraud Alert, "Fraud and Abuse in the
Provision of Medical Supplies To Nursing Facilities," OIG 95-09, (August, 1995).
" The anti-kickback statute does not define the term "remuneration," and the OIG has refused to
create a safe harbor for relationships involving a "de minumus" amount. See 56 Fed. Reg. at 35,954 (to
be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 1001). However, the OIG has also indicated that giving certain gifts, such as
free computers, may not violate the statute as long as those gifts do not have any "independent value" apart
from the service that is being provided. Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; 01G
Anti-Kickback Provisions, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,978. Similarly, although Section 231 of the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 prohibits offering inducements to individuals that is "likely"
to induce those individuals to order from a particular provider, there is an exception for incentives to
promote the delivery of preventive care. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(i)(6)(c) (1999).
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against the likelihood of overutilization and increased costs to federal health
care programs.
Another issue for providers to consider is the financial benefits that may
accrue to medical professionals depending upon their referring or prescribing
patterns. Although most providers and manufacturers recognize that making
overt payments to referral sources is illegal, they may wish to avoid marketing
activities that may give providers information or incentives that may increase
the likelihood of that provider engaging in improper conduct. For example,
a manufacturer of surgical equipment should not market its goods by
explaining that certain procedures are reimbursed at a higher rate than
comparable, non-invasive procedures used to treat the same condition.
Providers also should wish to avoid offering cash or other benefits in
exchange for providing marketing or sales-oriented tasks such as
"educational" or "counseling" activities with patients, or physician or patient
outreach activities.49
The preamble to the final safe harbor regulations issued in 1991 clarifies
that one issue the OIG has with independent contractor relationships is the
degree of control that the contracting party will have over the marketer. In the
preamble, the OIG indicated that a lack of supervision and control over
independent-contractor marketers has resulted in "widespread abusive
practices" because salespersons are not under adequate supervision and
control.5° Although two commenters asserted that they could achieve
appropriate supervision and control of independent contractors by including
restrictive terms in the contract, the OIG stated it could not expand the scope
of the employment safe harbor unless it could "predict with reasonable
certainty" that such a relationship would not be abusive.5
On its face, there appears to be a tension between the control that the OIG
expects a health care provider to exercise over a marketer and the test for
whether a relationship is an "independent contractor" relationship.52 One
possible response to this tension is to control the scope of activity delegated
to the marketer. That is to say, a provider may choose to limit the marketer's
activities in such a way as to minimize the chance of the marketer engaging
in abusive activities. For example, to comply with Medicare restrictions
against unsolicited telephone contacts, a supplier of durable medical
equipment should limit any marketers with respect to such activities.5 3 A
49 See OIG Special Fraud Alert, "Prescription Drug Marketing Schemes," (August, 1994).
so See 56 Fed. Reg. 35,981.
51 Id.
52 See Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296 (listing twenty factors as guides for determining whether
sufficient control may be exercised by an employer to establish an employer-employee relationship).
53 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395m(a)(17) (1999).
[Vol. 7:513
1999] MARKETING UNDER THE ANTI-KICKBACK STATUTE 529
provider may also restrict marketer's activities to comply with HIPAA
restrictions upon beneficiary inducements.' Violations of any such limitations
should, at the least, result in termination of the agreement, and providers may
wish to consider financial penalties in addition.
Another way to limit the possibility of abuses occurring is the use of a
compliance plan. The OIG now encourages all health care providers to create
compliance plans for their employees and contractors, notwithstanding its
previous assertions that employees are less likely to engage in fraudulent
practices than independent contractors, and it has even gone so far as to
publish "model" compliance plans targeted to specific industries.55 In this
regard, the OIG has expressed concerns with a variety of marketing-related
practices, including "compensation programs that offer incentives for items
as services ordered or revenue generated," 56and also expressed "concern" with
percentage-based payments for sales and marketing personnel, irrespective of
employment status. Although this again highlights percentage-based
compensation as an area of concern, the model compliance plan does not go
so far as to assert that such arrangements are per se illegal. To address this
issue, with respect to marketers in independent contractor arrangements,
health care providers may wish to demand a copy of the marketer's
compliance plan (on a confidential basis, of course) and include a
representation and warranty that the marketer will adhere to that plan.
VI. CONCLUSION
Unfortunately, there are no easy answers or "bright line" tests for health
care providers to consider in structuring marketing relationships. In the
current environment, with its focus upon reducing fraud as a means of
decreasing health care costs, activities that are common in other industries
may result in severe penalties, and other criminal sanctions. Providers that do
not carefully consider the effects of the anti-kickback statute in structuring
their marketing activities may find that they attract the wrong audience -
federal regulators.
One of the apparent contradictions in health care marketing is that too
much success may mean that the activity is problematic. Simply stated,
providers must recognize that consumers of health care may be vulnerable and
lack clear, complete information upon which the base health care decisions.
54 See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, P.L 104-191, § 231, codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(a)(5) (1999).
55 See e.g., 64 Fed.Reg. 36,360 (July 6, 1999) (compliance guidance for the durable medical
equipment, prosthetics, orthotics, and supply industry).
% Id. at 36,374.
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While unscrupulous providers may choose to use these factors for their own
benefit, they may do so at the risk that the government's fraud-fighters will
soon follow. However, even well-meaning providers should carefully review
their activities in order to ensure that they do not run afoul of the prescriptions
contained in the anti-kickback statute.
